By Sarah Bireete
Director of Programmes
Center for Constitutional Governance (CCG)
Introduction:
It is now more than 20 years since pro-democracy
grassroots organizations led struggles that eventually resulted in the
overthrow of long-serving authoritarian regimes in many countries in Africa. Since
the 1990s, there have been significant improvements in the transition to
democratic governance in Africa. However, there have also been some major
reversals.
Unfortunately, some pre-1990 incumbent leaders
(for example, Paul Biya of Cameroon and Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zimbabwe,
President Museveni of Uganda) remain in power, despite efforts by the
opposition to unseat them.
The failure of national institutions to grant
adequate protection to individual liberties continues to plague countries into
more democratic chaos
Political transformations across Africa have
rarely come piecemeal. Instead, they tend to come in waves, sweeping across the
region and leaving massive social transformations in their wake.
Previous
Key Uprisings in Africa:
1. Pre Independence mass movements: The first wave includes the
nationalist protests of the 1950s, a set of uprisings that culminated in the
formal independence of almost all African states. During this wave, nationalist
parties often moved to the forefront, redirecting often-inchoate and amorphous
popular outrage at colonial rule into a clear demand for independence. By
offering to negotiate with colonial rulers and constrain the undisciplined
masses, nationalist elites were able to reap the benefits of independence.
Unsurprisingly, once in power, the same elites quickly replicated many of the
ruling practices introduced by colonial regimes, devoting much energy to
demobilizing the popular constituencies that brought them to power in the first
place.
2.
The Soweto uprising or Soweto riots were a series
of clashes in Soweto, South Africa on June 16, 1976 between black youths and
the South African authorities. The riots grew out of protests against the
policies of the National Party government and its apartheid regime. June 16 is now celebrated in South Africa
as Youth Day.
3. The Third Uprisings encompass
protests centered in West Africa that occurred between the mid-1980s to early
1990s. These protests, a response to brutal austerity measures imposed upon
African states by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – Protests
against the Structural Adjustments
Programme (SAPs). These protests ushered in democracy across the continent.
Opposition parties, often founded and controlled by former members of the ruling
elite, successfully corralled popular energies into a narrow demand for
elections. But what was the content of these ostensibly democratic reforms?
Across Africa, participants in this
protest wave found their legitimate demands for reform replaced with empty talk
of multipartism. As Thandika Mkandawire wrote at the time, for too many
African states, the democratic reforms of the early 1990s amounted to little
more than “choiceless democracies,” assuaging the energies of protesters but denying
them what they truly sought: political and economic transformation.
4. “Arab Spring” – African Spring: The momentous people’s uprising
of Tunisia and Egypt caught off guard peoples and nations around the world, and
now clearly these upheavals have not only gripped the global community but they
also seem to have wider ramifications in North Africa.
The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt are the mass
upheavals of African people and they compel us to constantly re-assess the
past, and also enable us to come to grips with the complexity of the mass
protests and relatively understand the essence and outcomes of the mass-based
rebellions, although we may not figure out the definite future trajectory of
the movements.
The North African uprisings, like plethora of
other preceding uprisings throughout history, are not the deliberate preplanned
actions of people. The
human-agency-cum-peoples uprisings are indeed inseparable, but uprisings don’t
happen by design; they just occur, and when they come no force can stop or
deflect them because, in most instances, the impetus behind the upheavals
are a combination of fragile and/or weak
political systems and an angry people that have forged unity against the
manipulative, tyrannical, coercive, and authoritarian regimes.
In the Tunisian and Egyptian cases, although there
were no nominal leadership and the vanguards were amorphous, elite circles like
the Revolutionary Youth Alliance in Egypt have coordinated the performance of
the protestors by communicating with the different political groupings. The
distinct advantage of the North African uprisings anonymous and informal
leaders over the leaders of the classical revolutions is the fact that they
were able to use the latest digital technology in communication, and it is not
surprising that the mass upheavals are dubbed ‘Face Book Revolutions.’
The cause for the Egyptian popular uprising is
essentially the same with that of Tunisia because both were governed by
tyrannical regimes and both were engulfed by endemic economic crisis that
directly affected the stomach of the multitude poor and the wallet of the
middle class. Egypt, however, is much bigger than Tunisia and its population is
eight times higher than that of Tunisia. Egypt also has relatively sophisticated
civic and political institutions, including the most robust elite army in the
entire Africa.
The spark of mass upheaval has now spread all over
North Africa and the Middle East and in Algeria and Libya the protestors may
not easily dislodge the dictators, and confrontations between the police and
the people could be bloody, but in the long run democracy could triumph in the
entire North Africa and the rest of the continent.
What is the implication of the North African
uprising for Foreign Policy? I am of the opinion that the Western World can no
longer afford to support dictators and sustain their rule, although it is
understandable (but may be not morally acceptable) to deal with autocrats in
the context of real politic.
The many
individuals that participated in North Africa's grassroots revolution ... are
frustrated because their revolutions did not achieve their critical goals. The
struggles of grassroots organizations in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt are
symptomatic of what needs to be done throughout Africa to deepen and
institutionalize democracy.
CASE OF BURKINA FASO
In 1984, a year after coming to power at the head
of a military coup, Thomas Sankara addressed the U.N. General Assembly. Claiming the mantle for the dispossessed, for
women, for youths, for the poor, Sankara — then all of 34 years old and
just three years away from his tragic killing — told the assemblage of
international elites: “I protest on behalf of all those who vainly seek a forum
in this world where they can make their voice heard and have it genuinely taken
into consideration.”
Over the past three weeks, the events in Burkina
Faso, a country he bequeathed with its unquestionably brilliant name (Land of
the Upright People), justified his struggles and avenged his brutal murder.
The political and constitutional
crisis in Burkina Faso erupted with speed and has passed through stages of
military rule and the restored civilian rule now – with H.E Michel Kafando as the New President. Its immediate cause was a
scheduled vote to amend the constitution, which would have paved the way for
the incumbent president, Blaise Compaoré – who came to power in 1987 – to
prolong his stay. But on Thursday 30 October, protesters took to the streets in
the West African country’s main cities, Ouagadougou and Bobo Diolaasu, burned
down parliament and ensured the vote’s indefinite postponement.
The questions raised by these developments go to
the heart of constitutional democracy. They include why term limits have become
such a sensitive issue in contemporary Africa, and why and how citizens are
taking steps to protect them from abuse.
In Burkina Faso’s case, Article 37 of the 1991
constitution (which was revised in 2000, 2003 and 2012) imposes a two-term
limit for the president. The planned vote was the second time Compaoré had
sought to manipulate the rule; the first was in 1997, when he repealed the
term-limit provision set in 1991, before civil and political strife forced him
to reintroduce it in 2000.
Most sub-Saharan countries introduced term-limit
provisions as part of a package of reforms in the early and mid-1990s to
democratise politics and end the growing phenomenon of “life presidencies” in
post-colonial Africa. The events in Burkina Faso provide a fresh reminder of a
disturbing trend: presidents introducing constitutional term-limits only to
scrap them (or attempt to do so) when they are no longer politically
convenient. This has happened in two waves – with a third one now underway.
The political context of lifting
presidential term limits
The first wave came just before and after the turn
of the millennium. If Blaise Compaoré in 1997 was the pioneer, he was followed
by Sam Nujoma of Namibia (1999), Omar Bongo of Gabon (2003), Lansane Conté of
Guinea (2003), Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo (2002), and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali
of Tunisia in (2002).
The second wave picked up from the mid-2000s
through the turn of the decade with Idriss Déby of Chad (2005), Yoweri Museveni
of Uganda (2005), Paul Biya of Cameroon (2008), Abdelazziz Bouteflika of
Algeria (2008). There were also several failed attempts to abolish term-limits,
including in Zambia (2001), Malawi (2003), by Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria
(2006), Mamadou Tandja of Niger in 2009, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal (2011).
Today, a third wave is appearing, even as the
crisis in Burkina Faso unfolds. Incumbents in at least three other African
countries are currently seeking officially to scrap term-limit provisions to
pave the way for their re-election, while others may discreetly be preparing
the ground for it.
The first group comprises Joseph-Désiré Kabila in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi, and Denis
Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville. In a familiar tone, characteristic of how
changes have been engineered across the continent, allies of Rwanda’s Paul
Kagame have been urging him to stay and are now seeking a vote to allow him a
third term, even as the president himself remains suspiciously ambiguous on the
subject. The incumbent Yayi Boni In Benin, often considered a rare positive
story of francophone Africa’s democratic progress in recent decades, has also
proposed reforms to the 1990 constitution which many local actors see as a
strategic ploy designed eventually to extend his stay in power.
These nineteen countries, twelve of them
francophone and six anglophone (along with Cameroon which is both) are a sad
reminder of the challenges of entrenching democratic alternation of power and
constitutional governance on the continent. In this context of events in
Burkina Faso reinforce a glimmer of hope, resonant of the early days of
Arab-spring revolts, that the populace can rise up to demand political change.
They reveal that African political cultures, long held back by the chains of a
victim mentality or tribal or patronage-based loyalties, are becoming more
politically conscious and engaged. Younger Africans in particular are highly
distrustful of politicians and becoming more resilient against repressive
leadership. In addition they are also becoming more aware of their rights and
more willing to fight to protect the constitutions in which these rights are
enshrined.
The attitude of “Don’t Touch My Constitution” has inspired a French human-rights
project with this name and provoked African citizens to widespread protests. In
Senegal, the phrase was a rallying-cry for protesters as they fought Abdoulaye
Wade’s efforts in 2011 to run for a third term. The same was the case in
Cameroon in 2008 and more recently in the DRC. Although the protests have not
all been successful, they are significant for two reasons.
Impact of Burkina Faso Uprising
on Constitutional Democracy
Ø First, they demonstrate that
citizens no longer see constitutions as a matter for politicians alone, but as
determining their own relationship with these politicians. In other words, they
are beginning to recognize not only what a constitution is but also why it
matters for them.
Ø Second, they are a signal to
authoritarian leaders across the continent that citizens are no longer prepared
to remain passive observers while politicians make and break rules and tamper with
their constitutions for selfish political interests.
It is not hard to see why this is becoming the
case. Multiparty politics, introduced during the democratic reforms of the
early and mid-1990s, has failed to take genuine root across most of Africa. A
single party dominated by one individual has consistently dominated the
political space, due in part to questionable, yet barely challenged, electoral
victories. The well-known examples include Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Paul Biya’s Cameroon Peoples’
Democratic Movement (CPDM), Sassou Ngessou’s Congolese Party of Labour (CPL),
Joseph Kabila’s Peoples’ Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), and
Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
Opposition political parties are either too weak
to be effective due to an uneven playing-field, persecuted and intimidated into
silence, or become victims of different forms of cooptation by the ruling
regime. In consequence, such parties split apart or lose public credibility, to
the advantage of the ruling party. The examples of manipulation include
Cameroon’s Social Democratic Front (SDF) and Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC).
Moreover, the dominance of one political party has
created extremely weak political institutions. Legislatures are dominated by
the same party that holds the executive power; judiciaries are packed with
sympathetic judges; the military is co-opted with high salaries and other
benefits. Thus, parliaments and judiciaries become mere agents of the
executive, completely incapable of upholding the principle of separation of
powers and providing effective checks on the executive. Unsurprisingly, African
heads of state have become increasingly powerful and unaccountable, setting up
patronage systems in which friends and sympathisers are rewarded and
troublemakers punished.
All this has generated greater citizen distrust
with the broader political establishment across the continent, often reflected
in high voter abstention. Opposition parties as well as the ruling party are
increasingly seen as two sides of the same coin, having the capture and
retention of political power as their only objective and seeing political
office only as a means for self-enrichment. The torching of Burkina Faso’s parliament
and the homes of members of parliament from both regime and opposition sides is
a clear sign of this broader dissatisfaction.
LESSONS FOR UGANDA:
So how can the widely observed political apathy in
Africa be reconciled with the scenes in Burkina Faso, where citizens risked
(and in thirty cases lost) their lives in order to prevent a parliamentary
vote?
The timing is instructive. That the government was
overthrown at the moment it sought to entrench its power in the constitution
indicates a growing understanding of the separation of the state (as something
owned by the people-as-sovereign) from the government (as transitory managers
of the state on behalf of the people). The constitution provides the
rules which cannot be broken if this core concept of democratic
constitutionalism is to hold.
Blaise Compaoré - once regarded by some as
Africa’s venerated peacemaker - is now gone in disgrace. Will others
contemplating a longer stint in power take heed? Perhaps. But one lesson they
must learn from Burkina Faso is that Africa’s
citizens and youth are waking up and guarding their constitutions closely.
It’s no longer business as usual.
This simply means the OUR ELECTED LEADERS CANNOT
BE TRUSTED ON MATTERS THAT ARE CARDINAL TO OUR DEMOCRACY AND THE WELL BEING OF
THE PEOPLE.
CONCLUSION:
“Africa Uprising: Popular Protest
and Political Change” – is a manifestation of the failing Electoral
Democracy in Africa. The profound APATHY that has engulfed the whole continent
has left the people more hopeless than ever imagined. Independence and
democratization, both offered as resolutions to the continent’s structural
woes, have brought little improvement to the African masses. And despite all
the talk of “Africa Rising,” the challenges remain severe. After more than a
decade of positive growth across Africa, little wealth has trickled
downward to the
vast majority of people.
Ugandan Youth should shade off their “Overdose of
Fear – transverse the Political Jungles, brave the Tear Gas and Restore Sanity
in this Country.
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